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Abstract 
This paper reviews the economics literature on foreign aid. Aid supporters tend to emphasize results, 
while its detractors tend to highlight the incentives it provides (although they may still acknowledge 
some of aid’s positive results, particularly on public health). Like the modes to deliver it, research on 
foreign aid has evolved over the years. From the traditional aid-growth regressions research has 
refocused towards micro issues, including institutional inefficiencies or sector-specific bottlenecks. 
This tendency is positive, in so far as it can lead to useful policy advice that improves the way aid is 
given. Great gaps in knowledge remain, though. Notably, the aid market is poorly understood in aspects 
such as donors’ interaction with the recipient government or donors’ coordination. In terms of political 
economy, recipient countries’ decision making with regards to aid fungibility or the incentives provided 
by new types of aid (notably China’s) have been largely unexplored. Moreover, the types of public 
goods that improve households’ living standards are little understood. The scarcity of research on these 
questions is greatly due to lack of data – or even data opacity; if aid is to be better understood and 
improved, far greater efforts must be made in terms of collecting and sharing data. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents the key features and trends in the literature on foreign aid over the years, 
including relevant aspects relating to the policy realm and other practical concerns.1 Foreign financial 
assistance was conceived as a source of finance to poor countries and territories between World War I 
and World War II, however, aid as we know it today emerged with the Marshall Plan after World War 
II (Lal 2006). The world political context changed in the aftermath of that war and foreign aid soon 
became a tool to gain political clients (ibid). Decades later, the end of the Cold War led to another 
reconversion of aid’s goals, this time towards humanitarian purposes, although the old ones were not 
necessarily abandoned. Thanks to these changes, aid has not only survived, but thrived. The number 
of aid agencies has continued to increase and their business models have been reinvented, while most 
of the agencies created since 1945 still exist (Harford, Hadjimichael & Klein 2004a). For example, the 
UNICEF broadened its mandate from emergency situations to long-term issues relating to children 
and women everywhere.2 As a result, the ‘aid business’ (Hancock 1992) has become very substantial 
in many developing economies, going beyond 20 per cent, 30 per cent, and even 50 per cent of Gross 
National Product (GNP) (Lensink, White 1999). Without counting donors that are not part of the 
Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development 
(OCDE/DAC), the mean number of donors per recipient country has been estimated at 16 (Rahman, 
Sawada 2010). 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of aid is that, despite this expansion, it remains unclear 
whether it works. The debate, as old as aid itself, has intensified over the decades. Several features of 
the discussion can be highlighted. At its core is the disagreement as to whether aid contributes to 
development or not. On the one hand, some authors argue that aid leads to growth (Hansen, Tarp 
2001), although it has also been suggested that national growth-inducing policies may reduce its 
effectiveness because good policies and aid are substitutes (Dalgaard, Hansen 2001). A second group 
of authors argues that aid’s ability to engender growth is conditional on some key feature; for 
instance, aid works if it is provided to countries that implement good policies (Burnside, Dollar 2000), 
or if the climatic environment is appropriate (Guillaumont, Chauvet 2001). A third group argues that 
aid is clearly counterproductive, although the recommendations within that group also differ. Some 
authors argue that aid should be stopped altogether (Friedman 1995) whereas for others, the reason 
                                                          
1 The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) 
defines Official Development Assistance (ODA) as “those flows provided by official agencies under the following two 
criteria: i) they are administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as 
their main objective, and ii) they are concessional in character and convey a grant element of at least 25 per cent” (OECD 
Stat 2016). 
2 UNICEF was established in 1946 to meet the emergency needs of children in post-war Europe and China. Its full name was 
the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. In 1950, its mandate was broadened to address the long-term 
needs of children and women in developing countries. UNICEF became a permanent part of the United Nations system in 
1953, when its name was shortened to the United Nations Children's Fund (but its acronym did not change). Source: 
https://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_faq.html  
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why the different development panaceas (such as investment or debt relief) have not worked, is 
because purported basic economic incentives were not taken into account in the policy making 
(Easterly 2002b). 
A fourth group adopts an alternative perspective and argues that aid’s effectiveness depends on 
the goal set. Several objectives may be considered, such as poverty reduction, non-income factors 
such as starvation, education or health, donor countries’ guilt-relief or political support, or the 
maximization of some aid agencies’ flows (Kenny 2006). For instance, it has been found that school 
feeding programs significantly improve the growth and cognitive performance of disadvantaged 
children in developing countries (Greenhalgh, Kristjansson & Robinson 2007), or that male 
circumcision significantly reduces the risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) acquisition in 
young men in Africa (Bailey et al. 2007). It is argued that it is the high cost-effectiveness of aid that 
targets public health interventions which makes this aid worthwhile on average, even when other aid 
interventions may be worthless (Ord 2011). 
Different diagnostics lead to different policy recommendations. Some economists call for more 
aid (Sachs 2014), while others say developed states should ‘give what they can’ (Ord 2011), and yet 
others claim that the international community should stop looking for big ideas and adapt its 
expectations to small incremental improvements (Hobbes 2014). Although warning against superficial 
and overly optimistic judgments on aid, a different view notes that there may be no convincing case 
for abandoning or rejecting aid, because the enduring justification for development assistance lies in 
its fundamental expression of the humanitarian impulse (Riddell 1987). Hence, the focus can only be 
how to improve it. To better a system that is too technocratic and accountable to donors rather than 
recipients, a paradigm shift may be necessary though, and complex adaptive systems has been 
proposed as the way to go (Ramalingam 2013). This view envisions a reformed aid system in which 
donors do not rigidly adhere to pre-determined blueprints, but instead engage in experimental 
innovation, implement projects that work in partnership with local systems, and adapt on the fly to 
changing conditions (ibid). The political agenda underpinning aid is a central element in the debate: 
focusing on small interventions weakens the scope for donors to drive recipient countries’ agendas, 
which has been identified as a key source of the trouble aid brings to Africa (Glennie 2008).  
There are also calls to finish aid. It has been defended that it is immoral to prolong aid when the 
results upon which aid’s moral case is built (i.e. to help others) are missing (Mende 1973). Some even 
defend that African countries are poor precisely because of all the aid they have received, and add that 
ending aid would redirect accountability away from donors, towards recipient countries’ citizens 
(Moyo 2009). In a similar vein, development strategies in the poorest countries should be about how 
to leave aid behind and end its dependence (Tandon 2008), with the central idea of reasserting an 
indigenous path out of poverty – especially using countries’ diasporas (Phillips 2013). 
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2. Exploring aid 
As recently as 2009, the lack of texts explaining how aid organizations work in practice was described 
as ‘striking’, especially given the enormous interest in the topic (De Haan 2009). Although there has 
been little emphasis on microeconomic explanations of why and how aid would work (or not), there 
are two notable exceptions. The first, Martens et al. (2002), analyzed aid focusing on principal-agent 
theory. The second, Mikesell focused on the assessment of development projects and programs in 
relation to their objectives, and the alternative forms of aid available for achieving those objectives 
(Mikesell 2007).  
For decades, the thinking of western development economists was heavily influenced by the 
Solow model and its emphasis on capital accumulation through investment. Under this framework, it 
was expected that countries would be able to escape the poverty trap that prevented them from taking 
off. Once started on their virtuous circle, growth would continue and aid would no longer be needed. 
The successes of Marshall Aid in post-war Europe could be replicated in the Third World. The 
weakness of this approach as a theoretical foundation for aid became clear once it was obvious that 
aid investments were not leading to growth and that policies and ‘soft issues’ such as governance 
were critical (Krueger, Michalopoulos & Ruttan 1989). 
Much of the aid debate has been driven by macroeconomic empirical evidence, usually in the 
form of regression-based research, a methodology that commenced in the early 1970s (Papanek 
1973). That modus operandi has taken different forms to ascertain the influence of aid on (most often) 
economic growth (Rajan, Subramanian 2008), but also on human development indicators (Kosack 
2003). The use of the regression-based methodology (or its abuse) has been criticized on technical 
grounds, a classic example being the 145 right-hand-side significant explanatory variables with 100 
degrees of freedom (Durlauf, Johnson & Temple 2005).3 
Another macroeconomic issue on which aid research has focused is Dutch disease. The potential 
concern is that large inflows of aid may induce a real appreciation of the recipient country’s currency, 
thereby reducing its exports’ competitiveness. Evidence of aid-based cases of Dutch disease is weak 
(Isard et al. 2006), although some authors have noted that aid affects a country’s competitiveness 
adversely, lowering the relative growth of its export industries (Rajan, Subramanian 2011). This may 
partly explain the lack of robust evidence between aid and growth (ibid). In their examination of 
twenty-six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Fielding and Gibson (2013) noted a variety of 
macroeconomic responses, but did remark that the adverse effects of aid on exports would be 
mitigated if aid led to investments in the traded goods’ sector (Fielding, Gibson 2013).  
An interesting characteristic of the debate was the tendency to treat aid as homogeneous, 
neglecting the differences between its types. Such lack of attention, probably rooted in the 
unavailability of data characteristic of developing countries, persisted until relatively recently, even 
                                                          
3 As cited in Easterly (2007). 
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though some aid critics recognized long ago that there are different aid modalities (Bauer, Yamey 
1982). The different types of aid singled out include: “emergency and humanitarian aid (likely to be 
negatively associated with growth, since aid is given when calamities happen); aid that affects growth 
only over a long period of time, if at all, such as aid to support democracy, the environment, health, or 
education (likely to have no relationship to growth in periods of four years); and aid that is directly 
aimed at achieving growth: building roads, ports, and electricity generators, or supporting agriculture” 
(Clemens, Radelet & Bhavnani 2004). These authors find a strong positive relationship between 
growth and the third type of aid, while the relationship with the other types is less evident. Nowadays, 
even the strongest critics of aid distinguish the types of aid (Moyo 2009). 
Aid has also been analyzed by comparing it with other financial flows. For instance, while aid is 
influenced by political variables, foreign direct investment (FDI) is more sensitive to economic 
incentives, and particularly to ‘good policies’ such as property rights in the receiving countries 
(Alesina, Dollar 2000). Besides capital accumulation, it is generally acknowledged that FDI promotes 
economic growth mainly by way of technology transfer, which explains why FDI only works with a 
minimum critical mass of human capital – since this limits the economy’s capacity to absorb that 
technology (Borensztein, De Gregorio & Lee 1998). Thus, the effects of FDI come from higher 
productive efficiency: foreign firms have more ‘knowledge’ applied to production, owing to a 
combination of foreign advanced management skills with domestic labor and inputs (ibid).4 The main 
advantages of FDI over aid are therefore twofold.5 Foreign Direct Investments encourage economic 
growth and poverty relief, partly due to the incentives they provide for the transfer of ‘know-how’, 
partly because they are subject to the market test – this ensures they are carefully allocated and 
monitored (Klein, Harford 2005). As aid flows are not subject to these disciplines, they are not 
expected to be as effective. The comparison with other financial flows focused on their different 
qualities as follows (ibid, p.3): 
Qualities6    Example 
Benevolent, monitored, smart   Ideal development assistance 
Indifferent, monitored, smart   Foreign direct investment 
                                                          
4 A different issue would be what has been called the FDI-natural resource curse, i.e. do natural resources crowd out FDI? In 
this regard, evidence shows that natural resources have an adverse effect on FDI and that the FDI-resource curse persists 
even after controlling for the quality of institutions and other important determinants of FDI (Asiedu 2013). However, this 
topic goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
5 This does not imply that FDI may not have negative effects. For instance, in Venezuela some authors have reported 
negative spillover effects from FDI on the productivity of domestically-owned plants (Aitken, Harrison 1999).  
6 The criteria are: 
a. ‘How benevolent is the finance? The most benevolent finance would flow to the poorest people in the poorest 
countries exactly when they need it and would never need to be repaid. 
b. How well is the finance monitored? Perfectly monitored financial flows would go exactly where their owners want 
them to go. Imperfectly monitored flows might be spent on pet projects, stolen, or wasted. 
c. How much knowledge flows with the finance? Knowledge matters, whether provided as standalone advice or 
alongside financial flows. Much official aid is bundled with technical advice, but some private flows like foreign direct 
investment also come with advice and training.’ 
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Benevolent, unmonitored, smart  Careless development assistance 
Benevolent, monitored, dumb  Workers’ remittances 
Indifferent, monitored, dumb   Bond market finance 
Benevolent, unmonitored, dumb  Populist emergency aid 
One of the problems of regression-based research into aid is that the mechanism through which it 
would work is not explained, and it cannot be a “black box” if its pertinence is to be assessed 
(Bourguignon, Sundberg 2007). Three sequential steps are proposed: “a) External donors/IFIs to 
policy makers (the way aid is given), b) Policy makers to policies (governance and institutional 
capacity), and c) Policies to outcomes (knowledge of what works)” (ibid, p.3). 
In this regard, since the 1990s there has been a move towards analyzing the transmission channels 
through which aid would improve people’s lives. A first step was to investigate whether national 
budget allocations in certain sectors were associated with better outcomes, an approach that provided 
mixed results. For instance, the effect of public spending for education and educational attainment is 
low, while for health outcomes the picture is more mixed (Gupta, Verhoeven & Tiongson 1999). In a 
different sector, higher spending on water and sewerage might not lead to a proportional increase in 
the quality of service delivery, as leakages –both physical and financial– are high (Wolf 2007b). More 
recently, economists have also analyzed the determinants of public services, such as leaders’ decision-
making processes to provide public goods in resource-rich countries (Sarr, Wick 2010). Three aspects 
of sustainability have been identified as key for the success of service delivery programs: finance, 
leadership, and targeting of the most vulnerable populations (Mubangizi 2009). However, overall 
there has been little empirical research on the links between aid and service delivery. While Wolf 
(2007a) explores this area, her work focuses on the effects of aid volatility in low-income countries, 
where a large part of public expenditure for education, health, and water and sanitation is financed 
through aid (Wolf 2007a). 
The governance dimension is central in the debate about aid effectiveness, and is usually used 
against aid. For instance, some economists have analyzed aid effectiveness across different political 
models (elitist, egalitarian and laissez faire) to note that aid does not increase investment nor benefit 
the poor across political regimes (Boone 1996). According to this research, aid only increases 
unproductive consumption, as reflected by the size of Government (ibid).  
One of the most insightful theoretical frameworks of aid and political economy is probably the 
Selectorate Theory of Political Survival (De Mesquita, Smith 2009). This is based on the premise that 
leaders grant favors to retain office. If the system is a democracy, the coalition for leaders to stay in 
office is large, and leaders need to provide public goods. However, in autocratic regimes the coalition 
is small and private goods are offered instead (ibid). In this setting, aid is an instrument which 
political leaders use to retain office (not to alleviate poverty). To the extent that policies in the 
leaders’ interests favor the citizenry, policies to reduce poverty can be implemented, but such 
instances are coincidental (ibid). Leaders of donor countries (big-coalition countries) give aid in 
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exchange for policy concessions from recipient (small-coalition) countries (ibid). Thus, aid favors 
leaders of donor and recipient countries, and harms recipient-country (but not donor-country) citizens 
on two accounts: with bad policies and autocratic incumbent leaders who continue in power. A caveat 
is that, while this theory may apply to bilateral aid, it has little to say on multilateral aid (ibid). 
Another attempt to discern why aid succeeds or fails has concentrated on institutional 
inefficiencies and implementation issues. It has been observed that there is a critical information 
feedback loop, whereby those who pay – taxpayers from donor countries – are not in touch with those 
who receive the services – beneficiaries in poor countries (Martens et al. 2002). Therefore, correction 
of errors in the selection and delivery of aid is very difficult. Adding the fact that those actions may 
already be badly designed (e.g. due to a lack of local knowledge to conceive optimal initiatives) the 
problem is twofold: on the donor side, foreign aid agencies usually have multiple principals 
(especially multilateral organizations) who may represent conflicting interests – both for the donor 
and for the beneficiary. And on the recipient side, embeddedness is a critical for success in the 
implementation of institutional reforms (understanding embeddedness as the fact that those national 
officers working with donors to implement reforms may be part of the problem themselves, as those 
reforms may go against their own interests). Indeed, those in office are not independent of the world 
and, thanks to asymmetrical information, may not push hard enough for the desired change, in what 
has been called the ‘formal-versus-informal’ reform conflict (Martens et al. 2002). 
Using institutional analysis, Easterly (2002a) exposes some key problems in the environment that 
created aid bureaucracies. He argues that this environment led those international development 
organizations to, “(a) define their output as money disbursed rather than service delivered, (b) produce 
many low-return observable outputs like glossy reports and “frameworks” and few high-return less 
observable activities like ex-post evaluation, (c) engage in obfuscation, spin control, and amnesia (like 
always describing aid efforts as ‘new and improved’) so that there is little learning from the past, and 
(d) put enormous demands on scarce administrative skills in poor countries” (Easterly 2002a). This 
obfuscation may have political motivations, as donors only want to highlight the positive results of 
their aid and keep evaluation reports on their programs very close to their chests (Riddell 1987). 
Ironically, this provides ammunition to aid critics, who ask: if aid is doing so well, how come there is 
still poverty? (ibid). 
Other aspects may be solved through more rigorous evaluations. Aid evaluation has always been 
challenging due to the high number of factors involved in aid programs. Up until the 1970s, cost-
benefit analyses were common. From them 1980s, new challenges to evaluate aid appeared as 
changes in aid took place – in particular, the trend away from project-based aid towards policy-based 
lending (Berlage, Stokke 1992). As a result, traditional approaches such as cost-benefit analysis 
became increasingly limited (ibid). To achieve better evaluations, and although all economists do not 
necessarily agree (see e.g. Ravallion 2011), in recent years there has been a significant emphasis on 
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randomized evaluations as the most scientific method to assess aid programs (Banerjee 2007).7 
Despite the issues that remain open in the debate, a number of facts about aid have been learnt 
over the years. With regard to growth, for example, foreign assistance seems to matter more to tackle 
large negative shocks (Guillaumont, Chauvet 2001), and aid and growth don’t have a linear relation 
(Kourtellos, Tan & Zhang 2007). Aid shows decreasing returns (Dalgaard, Hansen 2001), which may 
even follow a Laffer style curve, i.e. turning negative beyond a certain threshold of around 40-50 per 
cent of GNP (Lensink, White 1999). 
Regarding the determinants of aid, it seems evident that a vital factor determining aid flows (and 
their effectiveness) is how recipient governments use the aid they receive (Feeny 2007). In a model 
assuming bounded rationality and an interactive relationship between the two factors of donors’ aid-
giving behavior (internal memory and environment), four main motives for aid were detailed: 
instrumental or self-centered, humanitarian or recipient needs-based, ideological, and incremental or 
inertia – i.e. where actual levels of aid allocations depend on previous levels (Imbeau 1989). The 
conclusion was that the instrumental reason is the best explanation once inertia has been accounted for 
(ibid). Thus, it seems clear that in addition to economic need, aid donors respond to political and 
strategic considerations such as colonial past and political alliances (Alesina, Dollar 2000). These 
motives can also change over time; for instance, the rising importance of Chinese aid in Africa 
(motivated by the availability of natural resources), may have contributed to a shift of US foreign aid 
to make it more recipient-needs’ based (Amusa, Monkam & Viegi 2016). 
Other authors have also examined the extent to which aid is allocated to reduce poverty. Sawada 
et al. (2008) find that in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, grant allocations from Canada, France, 
Japan, the Netherlands and the UK were consistent with the necessary conditions to reduce poverty 
(Sawada, Yamada & Kurosaki 2008). The overall results show allocation patterns consistent with 
poverty targeting, although there is a negative population scale effect, reinforcing the view that 
“strategic motives exist” (ibid). Finally, the coordination among major donors towards global poverty 
reduction has recently improved (ibid).  
It has also been argued that with a poverty-efficient allocation, aid would sustainably lift out of 
poverty around 19 million people per year, whereas with the actual allocation it lifts out an estimated 
10 million (Collier, Dollar 2002). From that standpoint, the other goals of aid (e.g. support to donors’ 
strategic interests) could be considered as a tax to poverty-reducing aid. 
 
3. From theory to policy 
Given what is known, how should foreign assistance be provided? Policy-makers do not always 
follow economic theory principles (as aid may be given for other geostrategic political motives), and 
translating knowledge into policy-making remains a challenging issue. With inconsistencies in the 
                                                          
7 Also known as randomized control trials (RCTs). 
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body of knowledge it is not easy to offer consistent policy advice; e.g. while there is no agreement 
about whether aid leads to growth, it is also argued that aid volatility is negatively associated with 
economic growth in the long run (Markandya 2010), and that donor proliferation linked to free-riding 
leads to a sub-optimality of aid flows (Rahman, Sawada 2010). 
What seems clear, looking at aid flows over time, is that conditionality has decreased (Harford, 
Klein 2005a) and country selectivity has increased (Dollar, Levin 2006) — effects that may have been 
associated with one another.8 It has been argued that the reason for increased country selectivity is the 
lack of credible punishments for breaching conditionality clauses (Djankov, Garcia-Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol 2006). Increased selectivity meant seeking recipients with better policies (Dollar, 
Levin 2006) and stricter screening of recipient countries by donors. For instance, in 2004 the USA 
established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which a country has to undergo 
performance assessments on 17 policy indicators before it can become eligible to receive assistance.9 
In the multilateral arena, in 2005 the World Bank started elaborating its Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessments (CPIA), which rate countries against 16 criteria from four clusters: i) 
economic management, ii) structural policies, iii) policies for social inclusion and equity, and iv) 
public sector management and institutions (World Bank 2011). These initiatives for higher selectivity 
were probably a consequence of evidence that more corrupt governments had not been receiving less 
aid – if anything the opposite (Alesina, Weder 2002). The emergence of such evidence supported the 
thesis that aid helps dictators, and had strong effects on some donors (De Mesquita, Smith 2009). 
Aid can be classified according to several criteria, e.g. based on its purpose, such as food aid, etc. 
A different typology relates to the way of delivering it. From World War II till the late 1970s, the 
main modality to deliver assistance in poor countries was project-based aid, at the core of what has 
been called the “Western” model (Hayter 1971). The Western model is characterized by funding from 
donors extended on a project basis and managed by expatriate professionals (Tisch, Wallace 1994), 
who typically can be in the country from a few months to about 3-4 years. This has been criticized 
because it can lead to cultural imperialism, as Western advertising, media or consumer goods reach all 
everywhere in the world (ibid). Though project-based aid is still important at present, the period when 
project-based aid reigned was characterized by a combination of growing world demand, foreign aid 
and stable commodity prices that favored a worldwide decline in poverty and an improvement in basic 
measures of human welfare (Mohan et al. 2000). During this time, there was ‘international 
adjustment’, and the burden was shared by donors and developing countries (ibid). In the 1970s, 
events such as the end of the gold standards in the US or the oil price crises favored a paradigm shift 
                                                          
8 Including tied aid, a type of conditionality that restricts the ways in which aid can be spent by the beneficiary country. As a 
form protectionism, the most criticized form of tying aid required that it be spent purchasing products or contracting private 
sector companies from the donor state (Jepma 1991). 
9 The MCC is a U.S. foreign aid agency whose most distinctive feature is ‘competitive selection’: before a country can 
receive MCC assistance through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), its performance is examined on 21 independent 
indicators (Source: https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund/indicators). 
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towards neoclassical/market-oriented policies (ibid). The shift led to structural adjustment programs 
in the early 1980s, where the burden of adjustment fell disproportionally on vulnerable segments of 
the population (Mohan et al. 2000; Tisch, Wallace 1994). Structural adjustment programs were 
characterized by lending (notably by the World Bank/IMF) conditional on countries’ undertaking the 
policy reforms required.10 When aid is lent, the amounts tend to be considerably larger than when aid 
is granted (i.e. given). Heavy lending for structural adjustment programs was at the root of great 
criticism against aid; pumping substantial amounts of money in poor countries with weak governance 
systems can result in corruption spikes where what was lent was lost (Payer 1991). Besides 
corruption, towards the late 1990s it became clear that structural adjustment was costly: it was widely 
criticized for its effects on the poor, countries’ debt kept mounting, and the expected results were 
hardly being achieved. Debates about how to help countries ease their debt burden started (e.g. with 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, HIPC11). Thus, from the early 2000s grants increased in 
importance –vs loans (Harford, Hadjimichael & Klein 2004b). Both grants and loans became 
increasingly aimed at middle-income countries and at recipients with good policies –vs. low-income 
economies and those with bad policies (Harford, Klein & Tilma 2004).  
Budget Support (BS) also grew from the early 2000s (Eifert, Gelb 2005), a move to support their 
fiscal consolidation from the revenue side also motivated by debt sustainability concerns, as well as to 
promote more ownership in recipient countries. Later, some evidence has shown that BS is correlated 
with progress in the Human Development Index and the Millennium Development Goals (Beynon, 
Dusu 2010). However, BS is no magic bullet either, some authors arguing that it may contribute to 
moral hazard by expanding recipients’ national budgets and avoiding necessary reforms (Brautigam, 
Knack 2004). Thus, if more aid does lead to deteriorations in governance, BS may lead to moral 
hazard in the form of lower tax-to-GDP ratios, or reduced efforts to mobilize national resources 
(Feeny 2007). 
Turning further into policy, the most central initiative to promote aid results was the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD). The PD is based on five principles (OECD, 2012): 
1. Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their 
institutions, and tackle corruption. 
2. Alignment: Donor countries align with, and use, local systems. 
3. Harmonization: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures, and share information to 
avoid duplication. 
4. Results: Developing countries and donors shift to, and measure, results. 
5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results. 
                                                          
10 Also known as policy-based lending. 
11 In 1996, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund launched the HIPC Initiative to create a framework for all 
creditors, including multilateral creditors, to provide debt relief to the world's poorest and most heavily indebted countries, 
and thereby reduce the constraint on economic growth and poverty reduction. 
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It was argued that the PD would make a difference because it was intended to monitor progress on 
accountability (OECD 2006). However, the PD proved to be no panacea and was complemented by 
the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, the aim of which was to strengthen and deepen 
implementation of the PD (OECD, 2012). The AAA pushed some PD principles into concrete actions, 
especially in the areas of ownership, inclusive partnerships, and delivering results (OECD, 2012). For 
instance, since the Paris Declaration in 2005 significant efforts have been exerted to reduce the 
practice of tying aid, especially by the OECD, and today it is arguably marginal (Clay, Geddes & 
Natali 2009). However, new donors are bringing new challenges. For example, China does provide 
finance that meets the definition of ODA but this share is relatively small. Export credits, non-
concessional state loans or aid used to foster Chinese investment do not fall into the category of ODA 
(Brautigam 2011). 
One of the most noteworthy recommendations of the AAA was that the predictability of aid 
should be increased. The issue of predictability was a reaction to recipients’ demands and involved 
two aspects. The first one was to give at least a medium-run horizon (typically 3 to 5 years), so that 
the recipient country could better plan ahead with the help of policy tools, such as Medium-Term 
Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF).12 
The second aspect demanded by recipients was that donors meet their pledges, as often 
commitments are incompletely materialized. Indeed, compliance with commitments to deliver more 
aid has received mediocre ratings (G8 Research Group 2007), although donor countries performed 
well when it came to debt cancellation (G8 Research Group 2015).  The delivery of the 0.7 per cent 
target of ODA relative to donor’s Gross National Income (GNI) has also been a challenge which few 
donors have achieved (OECD 2002). Since Sweden became the first country to meet it in 1974, 
Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Finland or Norway have had the best performance in that 
regard, although other countries such as the Netherlands or Luxembourg have also performed 
relatively well (OECD 2002). 
Although incomplete aid delivery may be an issue, many recipient countries often lack the 
capacity to absorb the aid they receive (even though it is not all the aid they were promised). Isard et 
al. (2006, p.12) insist that these absorptive capacity constraints “are largely microeconomic 
phenomena and should be analyzed and addressed as such” (Isard et al. 2006). 
 
4. Other practical issues 
As noted above, the overall challenge in the aid discussion is that there isn’t a very clear idea about 
whether it works, and/or under what conditions it does so. It has been asserted that, “the winners write 
economic history” (Easterly 2002b). This incomplete understanding is rooted, at least partially, in the 
                                                          
12 An MTEF is a planning and budget formulation process that Governments can use to establish credible projections of 
public revenue collection (usually within 3-5 years), and to allocate those resources based on strategic priorities. 
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data deficiencies which characterize developing countries. The paucity of good quality data has had 
several effects on the aid literature, including some selection bias. The nature of these effects is 
conceptually similar: insufficient hard evidence impedes an understanding of the intricate channels 
through which aid may have a positive impact on the final beneficiaries. However, although the 
distinctions are more illustrative than clear-cut, there are degrees of ignorance with different 
consequences. First, extrapolating from developed countries, economists may sometimes defend a 
specific viewpoint without the rigorous data analysis warranted, which can lead to poorly 
substantiated statements about the pertinence of aid (see e.g. Friedman 1995). 
The lack of data may also impede us from seeing the broader picture. If aid can be considered as a 
“market”, aid assessments are mostly based on the supply of aid, whether primary (donor’s 
principal—often taxpayers), or secondary (aid agencies), but rarely on the demand of aid 
(beneficiaries).13 When the demand of aid is analyzed, it is usually at the level of recipient countries’ 
governments, and rarely at the level of the ultimate beneficiaries (citizens – ideally the poor). Such 
lack of attention to the final beneficiaries arises because household surveys hardly collect data on 
development projects. Therefore, the emphasis is often placed on inputs, frameworks, plans, technical 
assistance or training instead of results (Martens et al. 2002). Additionally, since the clear 
mechanisms through which the final beneficiaries would benefit are not well defined, it is not difficult 
to see aid as a ‘black box’ (Bourguignon, Sundberg 2007). As noted earlier, to address such 
deficiencies there have been calls for more monitoring and evaluation (Martens et al. 2002), as well as 
for better evaluations (Banerjee 2007). 
Even where data is available on all sides of the aid market, its informational value vis-à-vis the 
intended analysis may be limited. A clear example of this is the failure of OECD data on aid to 
distinguish between types of aid (i.e. disaggregating aid flows by sector only started in 2002). A 
second example of data shallowness hampering research relates to aid fungibility. It is well known 
that aid is fungible, however, the aid literature has rarely taken this characteristic into account – 
probably a result of difficulties in measuring how decisions are made and how shadow savings would 
be used (e.g. if a donor condones debt to a poor country). After decades of development aid, the most 
influential work on the issue was done in the late 1990s (Devarajan, Rajkumar & Swaroop 1999). 
It seems clear that the traditional aid-growth regressions have been exhausted. Research on 
development aid has begun refocusing from macro to micro relations. This new approach may extend 
to include a geographical perspective and/or the nature of the relations considered. Regarding the 
                                                          
13 Not everyone agrees with seeing aid as a market. Some authors argue that aid can have a dose of ‘impure altruism’, 
because the donor derives utility from the very fact of giving – also known as the warm glow (Andreoni 1990). Based on this 
rationale, to the extent that the donor gives aid out of self-interest, the exchange would lose importance. Other authors such 
as Marcel Mauss emphasize, based on anthropological analyses, the difference between market and gift (Mauss 2002). 
Nonetheless, Mauss does acknowledge that gifts supply individuals with personal incentives for collaborating in the pattern 
of exchanges, which supports the idea of exchange (ibid). Despite these differing views, the idea of aid as a market is 
increasingly being accepted (Harford, Klein 2005b). The market for aid has also been referred to as market for policy advice 
(Custer et al. 2015) or market of ideas for policy change (Parks, Rice & Custer 2015). 
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geographical perspective, analyses in the past were typically performed across countries. Individual 
national studies can be of real value, however. For instance, a case study from Uganda found that only 
13 percent of aid reached its intended objective (Reinikka, Svensson 2004). Despite its potential to 
enrich the debate on aid effectiveness, research at national level has only become popular in recent 
years (De, Becker 2015). In terms of the nature of the relations considered, the new research approach 
tends to concentrate more on such micro issues as donors’ incentives (Mattesini, Isopi 2008), or 
whether aid is associated with specific subsector results, e.g. by investigating the extent to which aid 
aimed at private sector development responds to constraints identified by private firms as problems 
(Ferro, Wilson 2011). This new focus may be due to increasing doubts about the value of aid, or to 
growing pressure by taxpayers to know they are getting value for their money.  
There may be trade-offs to such direct, sub-sector level approaches to the assessment of aid 
effectiveness. Narrow relationship analyses may miss spillover effects or synergies, and assessing a 
development portfolio by evaluating its components individually may be incorrect. Ravallion makes 
the point succinctly, “the bundling of (often multi-sectorial) components in one portfolio is often 
justified by claimed interaction effects. But evaluating each bit separately and adding up the results 
will not (in general) give us an unbiased estimate of the portfolio’s impact” (Ravallion 2011). 
 
5. Conclusion 
An interesting generalization about the literature reviewed may be that aid supporters tend to 
emphasize results (whether it saves lives, reduces poverty, etc.), while its detractors tend to highlight 
the mechanisms or incentives it provides (although they may still acknowledge some of aid’s positive 
results, particularly on public health). Notable examples to criticize aid relate to moral hazard (e.g. as 
beneficiaries know that donors will be there for them, they make less effort to undertake much-needed 
reforms, mobilize internal resources, etc.) or adverse selection (e.g. if corrupt governments are more 
likely to receive aid, which helps their leaders to stay in power). 
Like the modes to deliver it, research on foreign aid has evolved over the years. From 
empirically-driven macroeconomic approaches (notably aid-growth regressions), analyses have been 
refocusing towards more micro issues, including institutional inefficiencies or mechanisms to stop 
seeing aid as a black box. This tendency is positive, in so far as it can lead to useful policy advice that 
improves the way aid is given in a specific context; an example of this, while their limitations should 
be acknowledged, may be the emphasis of recent years on RCTs. 
Despite the tendency towards understanding the specific circumstances of time and place 
(Hayek 1945), few scholars adopt middle-ground views about foreign aid – notable exceptions being 
Riddell (1987) or Krueger et al. (1989). Indeed, in recent years views on aid are quite polarized: from 
economists who think it will end poverty (Sachs 2005), to others who blame it for countries’ poverty 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Moyo 2009). The reason for this conundrum may be that, despite the better 
understanding we have gained, we still know little about the mechanisms through which aid works, 
14 
 
which favors oversimplification. Great gaps in knowledge remain in several areas. For instance, from 
an industrial organization perspective, the aid market is poorly understood in aspects such as donors’ 
interaction with the recipient government or donors’ coordination. In terms of political economy, the 
recipient country’s decision making with regards to aid fungibility, the incentives provided by new 
types of aid (notably China’s), or innovative ways of delivering it (e.g. cash-on-delivery) have also 
been largely unexplored. Perhaps most importantly, the types of public goods that households’ find 
useful in improving their living standards (highly dependent on the local context) are little understood. 
The scarcity of research on these questions is greatly due to lack of data – or even data opacity by 
development interventions, which ironically provides ammunition to aid critics. If aid is to be better 
understood and improved, far greater efforts must be made by both donors and recipient countries in 
terms of collecting and sharing data. 
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